How Do Chávez's Challenges Affect His Hold on Power?

Q: Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, who took office 11 years ago today, is facing a number of challenges to his popularity as his government prepares for legislative elections in September. Those challenges include a countrywide electricity shortage, high inflation and recent protests over government control of the media. How will these challenges affect Chávez in 2010? Will opposition politicians benefit electorally from Chávez's perceived weakness?

A: Michael Shifter, vice president for policy at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington: "As Hugo Chávez begins his 12th year as Venezuela's president, it is worth recalling that this is not the first time he has faced considerable difficulties and has seen a notable slide in his level of popular support. What mainly distinguishes this moment from previous ones is the gravity of the multiple problems and the fact that they are coincidental and reinforce each other. The government is extremely worried about the September congressional elections, which could conceivably shift the balance of power and make it more difficult for Chávez to push through his agenda. Unlike the uncontrolled crime and violence in Venezuela's major cities, the shortages and rationing of electricity and water have hurt Chávez politically, throwing him off balance and putting him on the defensive. After nearly a dozen years in control, Chávez can hardly blame the decaying infrastructure, lack of investment and mounting government inefficiencies on the 'squalid ones' or previous administrations. Chávez has underestimated Venezuelans' thirst for information, as reflected in a student movement reactivated by the closing down of the pro-opposition channel RCTV. In 2010, the protests are likely to spread, as discontent builds, especially within Chávez's own coalition. The key question remains whether the various opposition factions will be able to coalesce and mount a significant challenge to Chávez. Their ability to do so will depend substantially on their having a sound political strategy and effective leadership, which in the past have been lacking and have enabled Chávez to weather storms and sustain his rule."

A: Luis Vicente León, director of Datanalisis in Caracas: "Chávez lost more than 10 percentage points in his popularity rating in 2009, but he still has the support of more than half the country. He will try to compensate in ways that have helped in the past, and public spending will be essential. This strategy will have an inflationary impact in the future, but who worries about that when facing risks in the present? Money can improve the political environment and provide political breathing room. However, given the deterioration that has occurred in the country's infrastructure, while there may be dollars, there is no electricity, and while there may be money, there is no milk. This brings Chávez to a second parallel strategy: the creation of a 'vault of terror' to freeze his adversaries through the destruction of their principal symbols, converting the rest into actors fearful of their own destruction. The idea is to avoid generating a snowball effect with regard to his popularity. Chávez's restriction is that students are again on stage and their irreverence, together with their ability to transcend societal boundaries, has become a limit for him. We don't know how all this will end, but it remains clear that Chávez is no longer in the comfort zone that previously protected him. The opposition could take advantage of that, but first, they will have to fight among themselves."

A: Roger Noriega, managing director of Vision Americas LLC in Washington and former U.S. assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs: "Unlike past crises, the electricity shortage, economic woes, deteriorating infrastructure and spiraling crime rate are factors that cannot be resolved by spreading cash around. Moreover, the initial responses from the regime—for example, drastic devaluation and power rationing—seem to have compounded the problems. Although Chávez has proven in the past that he is an extraordinarily able manager of chaos, he may find that this combination of challenges will spawn dissatisfaction and unrest for the foreseeable future. His decision to crack down on RCTV and his saber-rattling toward Colombia may be desperate measures to take the offensive against his critics. Indeed, many of my Venezuelan friends believe that a recent spate of coup rumors may have been contrived by Chávez as a pretext for isolating and attacking the opposition or for launching an 'autogolpe' to derail elections. The opposition has been exhausted by a decade of repression. As a result, many believe that elections only serve to legitimize the regime, which has limited others' access to the media, jailed opposition leaders and used all the tools of a dictatorship to tighten its grip on power. Like many dictators before him, Chávez may have made peaceful change impossible, making political violence more likely. So, this year promises a period of permanent crisis in Venezuela because Chávez has destroyed the democratic institutions that would have helped defuse tensions, stabilize the country and forge consensus solutions. Although there may be little or nothing that outsiders can do to improve the situation in Venezuela, neglecting the problem has made matters worse because the democratic opposition feels abandoned and Chávez feels emboldened."

A: Daniel Hellinger, professor of political science at Webster University in St. Louis: "Falling approval ratings for Chávez will not automatically translate into opposition votes. Notably, many students in the vanguard of recent protests have advocated against cooperating with opposition politicians and parties. Capitalizing upon President Chávez's problems requires not only opposition unity but its ability to put forward candidates attractive to the swing group, the ni-ni ('neither-nor') in the barrios. Similarly, Chávez's PSUV needs to run candidates that inspire confidence at the grassroots, not only to gain votes but to motivate party cadre to turnout lukewarm supporters, especially with Chávez himself not on the ballot. Increasing polarization and political violence threaten the elections. Much of the violence comes from the extremes—the leftist Tupamaros that operate beyond Chávez's control and groups like Merida's M-13, which is repudiated by mainstream student leaders. Some sectors of the opposition seem to want to provoke government repression to stir support for a coup, not unlike what they did in 2002; the government sometimes obliges. RCTV seemed to provoke its recent suspension almost deliberately. Nonetheless, given the timing, the suspension raises concerns about civil liberties and the transparency of the coming elections. Should the opposition win an Assembly majority in September (unlikely, but not to be ruled out), an institutional crisis of the first magnitude could emerge. The international community needs to provide unbiased observation of current conditions in Venezuela, which means criticizing government abuses of incumbency and rights, but also condemning those groups and actions that manifest disloyal opposition, which is too often overlooked abroad."